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Philosophy	  of	  interdisciplinarity.	  What?	  Why?	  How?	  Uskali	  Mäki	  	  To	  appear	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  for	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  of	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  Abstract	  Compared	   to	   the	   massive	   literature	   from	   other	   disciplinary	   perspectives	   on	  interdisciplinarity	   (such	   as	   those	   from	   sociology,	   education,	   management,	  scientometrics),	   philosophy	   of	   science	   is	   only	   slowly	   beginning	   to	   pay	   systematic	  attention	   to	   this	   powerful	   trend	   in	   contemporary	   science.	   The	   paper	   provides	   some	  metaphilosophical	   reflections	   on	   the	   emerging	   “Philosophy	   of	   Interdisciplinarity”	  (PhID).	  
What?	  I	  propose	  a	  conception	  of	  PhID	  that	  has	  the	  qualities	  of	  being	  broad	  and	  neutral	  as	  well	  as	  stemming	  from	  within	  the	  (also	  broadly	  conceived)	  agenda	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science.	   It	   will	   investigate	   features	   of	   science	   that	   reveal	   themselves	   when	   scientific	  disciplines	  are	  viewed	  in	  comparison	  or	  in	  contact	  with	  one	  another.	  PhID	  will	  therefore	  generate	   two	   kinds	   of	   information:	   comparative	   and	   contactual.	   Comparative	  information	   is	   about	   the	   similarities	   and	   differences	   between	   disciplines,	   while	  contactual	  information	  is	  about	  what	  happens	  and	  why	  when	  disciplines	  get	  in	  contact	  with	  each	  other.	  Virtually	  all	  issues	  and	  resources	  within	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science	  can	  be	   mobilized	   to	   bear	   on	   the	   project,	   including	   philosophical	   accounts	   of	   models,	  explanations,	  justification,	  evidence,	  progress,	  values,	  demarcation,	  incommensurability,	  and	  so	  on.	  Given	  that	  scientific	  disciplines	  are	  institutional	  entities,	  resources	  available	  (and	   forthcoming)	   in	   social	   epistemology	   and	   social	   ontology	   will	   also	   have	   to	   be	  invoked.	  
Why?	   Establishing	   PhID	   is	   presently	   an	   obvious	   step	   to	   take	   for	   several	   reasons,	  including	   the	   following	   two.	   First,	   ID	   is	   an	   increasingly	   powerful	   characteristic	   of	  contemporary	   science	   and	   its	   management,	   and	   so	   it	   would	   be	   inappropriate	   for	   an	  empirically	   informed	   philosophy	   of	   science	   to	   ignore	   it.	   Second,	   contemporary	  philosophy	  of	  science	  happens	  to	  be	  particularly	  well	  equipped	  for	  addressing	  issues	  of	  ID	   thanks	   to	   the	  recent	  massive	  work	   in	   the	  more	  specialized	   fields	  of	  philosophies	  of	  special	  disciplines	  (of	  biology,	  of	  cognitive	  science,	  of	  economics,	  of	  engineering,	  etc).	  	  
How?	  Given	  the	  breadth	  and	  heterogeneity	  of	  its	  domain	  and	  tasks,	  the	  practice	  of	  PhID	  must	   be	   heavily	   collective.	   It	   must	   mobilize	   multiple	   competences	   and	   it	   must	   keep	  elaborating	  a	  systematic	  agenda	  (or	  perhaps	  several	  overlapping	  agendas	  in	  case	  there	  will	   be	   rival	   ‘schools’	   of	   PhID).	   While	   a	   lot	   of	   new	   conceptual	   work	   is	   needed,	   the	  approach	   is	   bound	   to	   be	   emphatically	   empirical,	   with	   a	   cumulative	   and	   mutually	  complementary	   series	   of	   case	   studies	   to	   be	   conducted.	   Among	   the	   methods	   to	   be	  employed,	  good	  old	  textual	  analysis	  of	  scientific	  publications	  will	  be	  supplemented	  with	  interviews,	   ‘experimental’	   techniques,	   participant	   observation	   as	   well	   as	   various	  interventionist	  approaches.	  The	  published	  work	   in	  PhID	  will	  often	  be	  authored	   jointly	  by	  philosophers	  and	  other	  scholars	  in	  science	  studies	  as	  well	  as	  practitioners	  in	  various	  scientific	  disciplines.	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Introduction	  Compared	   to	   other	   disciplinary	   perspectives	   to	   interdisciplinarity	   (those	   from	  sociology,	   education,	   administration,	   scientometrics),	   philosophy	   of	   science	   is	  only	   slowly	   beginning	   to	   pay	   systematic	   attention	   to	   this	   powerful	   trend	   in	  contemporary	   science.	   In	   what	   follows	   I	   will	   provide	   some	  metaphilosophical	  reflections	   on	   the	   emerging	   philosophy	   of	   interdisciplinarity	   (PhID).	   These	  reflections	   seek	   to	   outline	   answers	   to	   the	   three	   questions	   in	   my	   title.	   The	  constitutive	  What?	  deals	  with	  the	  sorts	  of	  phenomena,	  and	  the	  sorts	  of	  questions	  about	   them,	   that	   should	  be	   covered	  by	  PhID.	  The	  explanatory	  and	   justificatory	  
Why?	   is	   about	   the	   reasons	   for	   which	   philosophers	   should	   take	   this	   theme	   on	  board.	  The	  methodological	  How?	   is	   concerned	  with	   the	  advisable	  methods	  and	  principles	  in	  the	  philosophical	  study	  of	  interdisciplinarity.	  	  In	   outlining	   answers	   to	   these	   questions,	   I	   am	   advancing	   a	   call	   for	   systematic	  
collective	   research	   on	   the	   philosophical	   aspects	   of	   interdisciplinarity	   in	   science.	  Such	  research	  should	  be	  systematic,	  addressing	  a	  number	  of	   interrelated	   issues	  and	  producing	  results	  that	  can	  be	  challenged	  and	  that	  can	  provide	  the	  basis	  for	  further	  inquiry	  –	  hence	  systematic	  research	  of	  this	  kind	  should	  be	  cumulatively	  progressive.	   This,	   together	   with	   the	   vastness	   of	   the	   task,	   requires	   that	   the	  research	  is	  to	  be	  collective.	  A	  larger	  number	  of	  philosophers	  than	  is	  the	  case	  now	  should	  spend	  more	  of	  their	  time	  investigating	  different	  facets	  of	  the	  theme,	  and	  they	   should	   do	   it	   in	   interaction	   with	   one	   another,	   based	   on	   a	   division	   of	  intellectual	  labour	  and	  at	  least	  partly	  overlapping	  research	  agendas.	  And	  finally,	  this	   research	   is	   to	   provide	   philosophical	   perspectives	   to,	   and	   analyses	   of,	  interdisciplinarity	   in	   science.	   This	   implies	   an	   invitation	   to	   some	   slight	  reconsideration	   of	   the	   research	   agenda	   and	   research	   strategy	   of	   philosophy	   of	  science	  itself.	  Let	  me	  call	  this	  composite	  invitation	  by	  the	  name	  Call	  for	  PhID.	  	  Thus	   far,	   interdisciplinarity	   has	   attracted	   systematic	   and	   collective	   attention	  mainly	   from	   researchers	   in	   fields	   such	   as	   sociology,	   history,	   education,	  administration,	   and	   scientometrics.	   While	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   (especially	   if	   taken	  together)	   these	   disciplinary	   perspectives	   reach	   far	   beyond	   the	   domain	   of	  philosophy	   of	   science,	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   the	   image	   of	   interdisciplinarity	   they	  provide	   is	   often	   narrow,	   sometimes	   shallow.	   They	   often	   miss	   versions	   of	  interdisciplinarity	  that	  are	  easy	  for	  philosophy	  of	  science	  to	  recognize;	  they	  may	  provide	   mistaken	   diagnoses	   and	   doubtful	   recipes	   in	   promoting	  interdisciplinarity;	   and	   the	   accounts	   they	   offer	   may	   be	   lacking	   in	   conceptual	  clarity	   or	   depth	   of	   reasoning.	   It	   is	   time	   for	   philosophy	   of	   science	   to	   put	   this	  complex	   phenomenon	   on	   its	   collective	   agenda.	   Philosophy	   of	   science	   is	   to	  address	   issues	   that	   such	   other	   fields	   do	   not	   address	   –	   or	   address	   them	  insufficiently	   or	   deficiently	   -­‐-­‐	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   learning	   from	   them	   and	  expanding	  its	  own	  horizons	  regarding	  both	  the	  targets	  and	  tools	  of	  philosophical	  inquiry.	  Yet	  in	  contrast	  to	  some	  other	  programmatic	  statements	  for	  a	  philosophy	  of	   interdisciplinarity	   (e.g.	   Frodeman	   2013),	   my	   proposal	   is	   to	   develop	   a	   PhID	  that	  stems	  from	  within	  the	  conventional	  agenda	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  Doing	  so	  is	  not	  without	  conceptual	  and	  practical	  problems	  (including	  the	  issue	  of	  what	  we	  want	  to	  mean	  by	  ‘philosophy	  of	  X’),	  so	  these	  too	  must	  be	  examined	  as	  part	  of	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the	  Call	  for	  PhID.1	  	  I	   will	   put	  my	   remarks	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   series	   of	   theses	   or	   observations.	   Some	   of	  them	  are	  factual	  claims	  while	  some	  others	  are	  more	  normative.	  Some	  of	  them	  are	  less	   controversial,	   while	   some	   others	   might	   be	   more	   so.	   In	   some	   cases	   the	  emphasis	   will	   be	   more	   on	   the	   articulation	   than	   on	   the	   defense	   of	   the	  observations.	  There	  is	  no	  smoothly	  flowing	  argument	  in	  the	  paper,	  but	  the	  points	  are	  hopefully	  organized	  in	  a	  sense-­‐making	  manner	  in	  three	  sections.	  I	  will	  start	  with	   observations	   about	   the	   growth	   of	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   (hassle	   around)	  interdisciplinarity;	   then	   proceed	   to	   pointing	   out	   some	   of	   its	   complexities;	   and	  finally	  highlight	  the	  role	  of	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science	  in	  its	  analysis	  as	  well	  as	  the	  benefits	   for	  philosophy	   from	  engaging	   itself	   in	   the	  endeavor.	  What	   follows	  has	  the	  taste	  of	  a	  manifesto	  rather	  than	  being	  a	  survey	  of	  the	  literature,	  so	  it	  will	  be	  parsimonious	  with	  references.	  	  
Growth	  of	  interdisciplinarity	  	  	  1.	  There	  is	  a	  simple	  argument	  in	  support	  of	  the	  Call,	  explaining	  why	  philosophy	  of	  science	  should	  meet	  it.	  	  
	  
Premise	  1:	  It	  is	  part	  of	  the	  agenda	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science	  that	  it	  should	  be	  informed	  about,	  and	  should	  produce	  information	  about,	  major	  features	  of	  contemporary	  science.	  	  	  
Premise	  2:	  Interdisciplinarity	  plays	  an	  increasingly	  central	  role	  in	  contemporary	  scientific	  research	  and	  its	  governance.	  	  
Conclusion:	  Philosophy	  of	  science	  should	  meet	  the	  Call	  for	  PhID.	  	  	  While	   I	   think	   it	  will	  be	   important	   to	   critically	  and	  open-­‐mindedly	  examine	  any	  allegations	   about	   the	   agenda	   of	   philosophy	   of	   science,	   I	   take	   Premise	   1	   to	   be	  beyond	   question.	   Further	   elaborations	   are	   needed	   (e.g	   about	   the	   kind	   of	  information	  philosophy	  of	  science	  is	  supposed	  to	  need	  as	  input	  and	  to	  create	  as	  output),	  and	  some	  of	  these	  will	  be	  provided	  in	  the	  course	  of	  this	  paper,	  including	  Section	  3	  below.	  The	  present	  section	  deals	  with	  aspects	  of	  Premise	  2.	   If	   indeed	  interdisciplinarity	  is	  growing	  in	  a	  way	  that	  has	  relevance	  to	  the	  issues	  studied	  by	  philosophy	   of	   science	   –	   or	   issues	   that	   it	   had	   better	   study	   –	   then	   obviously	  philosophy	  of	  science	  must	  take	  phenomena	  of	  interdisciplinarity	  on	  board.	  	  Other	   disciplinary	   perspectives	   have	   already	   responded	   to	   the	   growth	   of	  interdisciplinarity	   and	   have	   generated	   empirical	   and	   theoretical	   work	   on	   the	  phenomenon,	  providing	  advice	  for	  design,	  mostly	  to	  promote	  interdisciplinarity.	  These	   perspectives	   include	   those	   from	   sociology	   and	   history,	   education	   and	  pedagogics,	  administration	  and	  management	  scientometrics	  and	  library	  studies.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  study	  of	  interdisciplinarity	  from	  a	  philosophy	  of	  science	  vantage	  point	  has	  been	  on	  the	  TINT	  agenda	  since	  2006	  (see	  http://www.helsinki.fi/tint).	  Several	  workshops	  and	  conferences	  have	  been	  organized,	  and	  many	  of	  the	  papers	  have	  been	  published	  in	  special	  issues	  of	  journals	  such	  as	  Biology	  and	  Philosophy	  (Weisberg,	  Okasha,	  Mäki	  2010),	  
Perspectives	  on	  Science,	  (Grüne-­‐Yanoff	  and	  Morgan	  2012),	  Studies	  in	  History	  and	  
Philosophy	  of	  Science	  (Grüne-­‐Yanoff	  and	  Mäki	  2014).	  Other	  similar	  activities	  include	  a	  special	  issue	  of	  Synthese	  (Hoffmann,	  Schmidt	  and	  Nersessian	  2013).	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These	   are	   to	   be	   supplemented	   and	   enriched	   by	   philosophical	   perspectives,	   for	  the	  benefit	  of	  all	  parties.	  	  	  	  2.	  Talk	   about	   interdisciplinarity	   is	   different	   from	   interdisciplinarity	   present	   in	  
scientific	  practice.	  The	  two	  may	  be	  (and	  often	  are)	  out	  of	  phase	  with	  one	  another.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  there	  is	  quite	  some	  empty,	  pretentious	  or	  misguided	  talk	  about	  interdisicplinarity;	  on	   the	  other,	   there	   is	  much	  unrecognized	  or	  misunderstood	  genuine	  interdisciplinarity	  in	  the	  actual	  practice	  of	  science.	  One	  should	  therefore	  not	   uncritically	   draw	   straightforward	   inferences	   from	   the	   talk	   to	   the	   thing	   in	  making	  observations	  about	  the	  structures	  of	  interdisciplinarity	  or	  about	  changes	  in	   its	   prevalence,	   and	   one	   should	   also	   be	   earnestly	   cautious	   with	   normative	  recommendations,	  both	  in	  giving	  and	  judging	  them.	  	  The	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  two	  –	  talk	  and	  practice	  -­‐	  are	  connected	  are	  to	  be	  examined	  separately.	  Even	  if	  different,	  and	   sometimes	   independent,	   talk	   and	   practice	   share	   something	   important	   in	  common:	  presently	  they	  both	  grow.	  	  3.	   Talk	   about	   interdisciplinarity	   has	   been	   growing	   especially	   since	   the	   1970s.	  This	  shows,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  enlarging	  number	  of	  published	  books	  and	  articles	  dealing	   with	   various	   facets	   of	   interdisciplinary	   research	   and	   education.	   This	  trend	   has	   reached	   the	   point	   of	   publishing	   handbooks,	   such	   as	   Handbook	   of	  
Transdisciplinary	  Research	  (Hirsch	  Hardon	  et	  al.	  2008)	  and	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  
Interdisciplinarity	   (Frodeman	   et	   al.	   2010).	   But	   publications	   don’t	   drive	   the	  phenomenon,	  they	  manifest	  it	  while	  naturally	  also	  facilitating	  it.	  Importantly,	  the	  growth	  of	   talk	   about	   interdisciplinarity	   shows	   in	   the	  declarations	   and	   calls	   for	  proposals	  by	  research	  funding	  agencies.	  This	  phenomenon	  ranges	  from	  the	  local	  to	  the	  national	  to	  the	  multinational	  levels	  (such	  as	  from	  particular	  universities	  to	  the	  European	  Research	  Council).	  In	  responding	  to	  these	  calls,	  scholars	  and	  their	  groups	  do	  their	  best	  to	  advertise	  their	  proposed	  research	  as	  interdisciplinary.	  On	  both	   sides,	   talk	   about	   interdisciplinarity	   may	   be	   just	   a	   matter	   of	   wishful	  programmatic	   declaration	   or	   of	   truthful	   factual	   description,	   or	   something	   in	  between.	   The	   rhetoric	   of	   interdisciplinarity	   –	   whether	   truthful	   or	   merely	  pretentious	   or	  wishful	   -­‐-­‐	   is	   an	   important	   relatively	   new	   part	   of	   contemporary	  academic	  practice	  and	  should	  be	  on	  the	  agenda	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science	  as	  well	  as	   other	   fields	   looking	   into	   the	   actualities	   of	   scientific	   practice.	   Philosophical	  scrutiny	   of	   this	   talk	   could	   be	   of	   some	   help	   in	   distinguishing	   between,	   say,	  adequate	  promise	  and	  wishful	  pretension.	  	  4.	   Data	   would	   also	   seem	   to	   suggest	   that	   interdisciplinarity	   in	   actual	   scientific	  practice	   is	   growing.	   Scientometricians	   have	   sought	   to	   measure	   degrees	   of	  interdisciplinarity	   and	   their	   changes,	   for	   example	   by	   counting	   the	   numbers	   of	  citations	  across	  disciplinary	  boundaries.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  see	  that	  such	  data	  are	  limited	  in	  their	  informational	  contents;	  for	  example,	  they	  typically	  do	  not	  reveal	  important	   facts	   about	   the	   reasons	   and	   cultures	   of	   citation	   practices	   nor	   the	  institutional	   nuances	   of	   scientific	   practice	   in	   general.	   The	   institutions	   and	  practices	  of	  science	  are	  not	  uniform	  across	  disciplines.	  One	  consequence	  is	  that	  the	   claim	   about	   the	   growth	   of	   interdisciplinarity	  must	   be	   heavily	   qualified	   by	  considerations	   of	   heterogeneity.	   First,	   science	   overall	   is	   heterogeneous	   in	   this	  respect.	  Disciplines	  relate	   to	   interdisciplinarity	  differently.	  The	  phenomenon	  of	  growth	  is	  more	  prevalent	  in	  some	  areas	  than	  in	  others	  (see	  e.g.	  Levitt,	  Thelwall,	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Oppenheim	  2011).	  Second,	   interdisciplinarity	   itself	   is	  heterogeneous.	  There	  are	  great	  many	  variations	  of	   it,	   and	   they	  have	  different	  histories	   and	   conditions	  of	  realization.	   Some	   are	   as	   old	   as	   disciplines	   themselves,	   while	   the	   popularity	   of	  some	  others	  are	  of	  more	  recent	  origins.	  	  	  
Discplinarity	  and	  interdisciplinarity	  –	  and	  their	  heterogeneity	  	  5.	   It	   is	   commonplace	   to	   define	   interdisciplinarity	   rather	   richly	   in	   end-­‐means	  terms.	   Interdisciplinarity	   in	   these	   characterizations	   manifests	   the	   ambition	   to	  solve	   broad	   or	   complex	   problems	   by	   combining	   and	   integrating	   two	   or	   more	  disciplinary	   perspectives,	   themselves	   alone	   too	   narrow	   or	   simple	   for	   the	   task	  (e.g.	  Klein	  and	  Newel	  1996).	  Such	  ideas	  are	  echoed	  in	  the	  mission	  statements	  of	  many	  research	  funding	  agencies,	  such	  as	  the	  NSF	  and	  ERC	  and	  many	  others.	  Here	  is	  an	  example	  that	  captures	  the	  spirit:	  “Horizon	  2020	  should	  stimulate	  a	  break-­‐down	  of	   the	   silos	   of	   different	   research	   disciplines	   and	   stimulate	   integration	   in	  order	  to	  maximize	  impact.”	  (Horizon	  2020,	  2014,	  6)	  	  The	  above	  and	  many	  similar	  characterizations	  provide	  intensionally	  rather	  thick	  	  concepts	   of	   interdisciplinarity,	   and	   so	   excluding	   from	   their	   extensions	   many	  important	  types	  of	  interdisciplinary	  encounter	  or	  relationship.	  My	  preference	  is	  for	  an	  intensionally	  much	  thinner	  and	  thereby	  extensionally	  broader	  concept	  of	  interdisciplinarity	   that	   I	   suggest	   putting	   simply	   in	   terms	   of	  whatever	   relevant	  
relationship	  between	   two	  or	  more	   scientific	  disciplines	  or	   their	  parts.	  This	  keeps	  silent	   about	   the	   ambitions	   driving	   it	   (e.g.	   seeking	   to	   solve	   complex	   problems)	  and	   the	   forms	   and	  means	   adopted	   (e.g	   integration	   of	   conceptual	   frameworks).	  This	  results	   in	  a	  more	  encompassing	  notion	  that	  also	  has	  the	  nice	  advantage	  of	  giving	  PhID	  more	  work	  to	  do!	  	  6.	   Interdisciplinarity	   is	   dependent	   on	   disciplinarity,	   both	   conceptually	   and	  causally.	  The	  conceptual	  dependence	  is	  obvious:	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  former	  must	  be	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  that	  of	   the	   latter.	  This	  reveals,	   for	  example,	   that	  without	  disciplines,	  interdisciplinarity	  would	  be	  inconceivable.	  If	  disciplines	  were	  to	  fade	  away	  –	  as	  some	  enthusiasts	  of	  interdisciplinarity	  sometimes	  would	  seem	  to	  wish	  –	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  interdisciplinarity	  would	  become	  inconceivable.	  Regarding	  the	  causal	   connection,	   calls	   for,	   and	   actual	   implementations	   of,	   interdisciplinarity	  often	  (but	  not	  always)	  appear	  as	  reactions	   to	  disciplinarity.	   In	   these	  situations,	  specialization	   (narrowing)	  and	  disciplining	   (tightening	  of	  disciplinary	   “law	  and	  order”)	   engender	   needs	   for	   broadening	   the	   perspectives	   by	   trespassing	   and	  transgressing	   disciplinary	   boundaries	   in	   attempting	   to	   serve	   some	   otherwise	  hard	  to	  serve	  goals	  or	  needs	  –	  such	  as	   the	  epistemic	  needs	  of	  novel	   theoretical	  innovation,	   or	   of	   reliable	   and	   accurate	   prediction;	   or	   the	   practical	   needs	   of	  finding	  solutions	  to	  some	  challenging	  complex	  social	  problems.	  	  	  7.	   Interdisciplinarity	   (just	  as	  disciplinarity)	   is	   far	   from	  uniform,	  but	  no	  agreed-­‐upon	   and	   perfectly	   well	   designed	   typology	   of	   kinds	   of	   interdisciplinarity	   is	  available.	  Categories	  such	  as	  multi-­‐,	   inter-­‐,	  cross-­‐,	  pluri-­‐,	  trans-­‐,	  and	  other	  kinds	  of	   X-­‐disciplinarity	  have	   received	  multiple	  definitions	   in	   the	   literature,	   but	   they	  often	   lack	   sufficient	   analytical	   rigour.	   They	   allow	   for	   further	   divisions	   into	  subcategories,	   their	   boundaries	   remain	   vague,	   and	   the	   underlying	   dimensions	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have	   not	   been	   elaborated	  with	   sufficient	   care.	   The	  more	   primitive	   concepts	   in	  terms	   of	   which	   these	   typologies	   are	   construed	   include	   those	   of	   complexity,	  integration,	   division	   of	   research	   tasks,	   collaboration,	   participation,	   transfer,	  expansion,	   unification,	   triangulation,	   pluralism,	   and	   much	   more.	   The	   relevant	  dimensions	   these	   concepts	   can	   be	   used	   for	   creating	   are	  many,	   such	   as	   less	   to	  more	   integration,	   less	   to	   more	   collaboration,	   less	   to	   more	   extra-­‐academic	  involvement,	  and	  so	  on.	  A	  variety	  of	  typologies	  have	  been	  suggested,	  but	  there	  is	  plenty	   of	   room	   for	   conceptual	   sophistication.	   Given	   the	   convolutions	   of	   this	  conceptual	   landscape,	   I	   don’t	   expect	   the	   efforts	   to	   be	   completed	   very	   soon,	   so	  any	   rushed	   attempt	   to	   stabilize	   the	   terminology	   would	   be	   premature.	   My	  methodological	  advice	  for	  this	  project	  is	  to	  make	  conceptual	  and	  empirical	  work	  interact:	   we	   need	   more,	   and	   more	   kinds	   of,	   empirical	   case	   studies	   on	  interdisciplinary	   practices	   in	   science;	   and	   the	   expanding	   range	   of	   case	   studies	  should	  inform,	  and	  be	  informed	  by,	  our	  attempts	  to	  bring	  conceptual	  order	  in	  the	  rich	  variety	  of	   interdisciplinary	  scientific	  practices.	   	  My	  expectation	   is	   that	   this	  project,	   when	   implemented	   well,	   will	   not	   converge	   into	   a	   single	   superior	  typology	   capable	   of	   encompassing	   all	   relevant	   kinds,	   but	   rather	   a	   family	   of	  typologies,	  each	  based	  on	  a	  distinct	  underlying	  dimension,	  or	  a	  small	  set	  of	  such	  dimensions.	  	  	  8.	  In	  order	  to	  fully	  appreciate	  the	  immense	  heterogeneity	  of	  interdisciplinarity,	  it	  is	   important	   to	   be	   aware	   of	   the	   heterogeneity	   of	   disciplinarity.	   Scientific	  disciplines	   constitute	   quite	   a	   varied	   assortment.	   There	   are	   many	   sources	   and	  many	  kinds	  of	  this	  heterogeneity,	  among	  them	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  disciplines	  are	  inherently	  interdisciplinary	  in	  that	  their	  characteristic	  activities	   include	  a	   lot	  of	  interdisciplinary	  traffic	  or	  collaboration,	  and	  that	  this	  is	  encouraged	  by	  the	  local	  conventions	  and	  reward	  structures	  within	   these	  disciplines.	  This	   comes	   in	   two	  versions.	  First,	  the	  disciplinary	  identity	  of	  some	  hybrid	  disciplines	  may	  be	  based	  on	   continuous	   importation	   of	   items	   -­‐-­‐	   such	   as	   theories,	   techniques,	   evidence,	  results	   of	   research	   –	   from	   other	   disciplines	   and	   on	   modifying	   them	   and	  combining	   them	   with	   one	   another	   within	   the	   home	   discipline.	   Just	   think	   of	  archaeology,	   cognitive	   science,	   systems	   biology,	   medical	   humanities,	  astrobiology,	  human	  geography,	  and	  development	  studies	  as	  (among	  themselves	  different)	   examples.	   Second,	   inherent	   interdisciplinarity	   may	   be	   exportation-­‐based,	   such	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   game	   theory	   or	   computational	   science	   (or	  economics	   or	   evolutionary	   theory)	   that	   are	   on	   a	   constant	   lookout	   for	   further	  applications	  in	  new	  domains	  and	  disciplinary	  contexts.	  Naturally,	  the	  transfer	  of	  an	   item	   across	   disciplinary	   boundaries	   may	   be	   a	   result	   of	   efforts	   of	   both	  importation	   and	   exportation	   that	   pull	   in	   a	   sufficiently	   similar	   direction	   on	   the	  map	   of	   disciplines.	   And	   sometimes	   the	   interaction	  may	   take	   on	   the	   ambitious	  form	  of	  research	  collaboration.	  	  9.	   More	   generally,	   regarding	   the	   ease,	   propensity,	   and	   direction	   of	   crossing	  disciplinary	   boundaries,	   some	   disciplines	   are	   characteristically	   inward-­open.	  They	   have	   a	   high	   propensity	   to	   adopt	   items	   from	   other	   disciplines;	   such	   an	  activity	  of	  borrowing	  or	  importing	  is	  highly	  valued	  as	  disciplinarily	  appropriate	  intellectual	   conduct.	   Some	   other	   disciplines	   are	   more	   outward-­open,	   they	   are	  disposed	  to	  expand	  the	  reach	  of	  their	  own	  theories	  and	  techniques	  to	  ever	  new	  domains	   and	   disciplines.	   Yet	   other	   disciplines	   are	   far	   more	   closed	   and	   self-­‐
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sufficient,	  so	   there	   is	  much	   less	  cross-­‐border	   interdisciplinary	  activity	   in	  which	  they	  are	  characteristically	  involved,	  either	  inwards	  or	  outwards.	  	  10.	   Philosophy	   of	   science	   itself	   manifests	   both	   kinds	   of	   openness.	   The	   popular	  “naturalist”	  claim	  that	  there	  should	  be	  a	  close	  connection	  or	  continuum	  between	  philosophy	   and	   science	   is	   a	   thesis	   about	   interdisciplinarity.	   It	   recommends	  philosophical	   theorizing	   about	   science	   to	   proceed	  on	   the	   basis	   of	   inward-­‐open	  interdisciplinary	  structures.	  There	  are	  two	  versions	  of	  this.	  The	  external	  version	  suggests	   that	   science	   (eg	   history	   and	   sociology)	   of	   science	   should	   impose	  evidential	   constraints	   on	   philosophical	   claims	   about	   scientific	   practice	   in	   that	  philosophical	   theories	   are	   to	   be	   informed	   by,	   or	   tested	   against	   the	   evidence	  produced	   by	   the	   scientific	   study	   of	   scientific	   practice.	   The	   internal	   version	  suggests	  that	  relevant	  parts	  of	  science	  (eg	  cognitive	  science,	  evolutionary	  theory,	  economics)	   should	   provide	   inputs	   to	   the	   construction	   of	   the	   contents	   of	  philosophical	   accounts	   of	   science,	   so	   that	   there	   be	   continuity	   between	   the	  contents	  of	  philosophical	  theories	  and	  those	  of	  the	  relevant	  scientific	  theories.	  	  	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   philosophy	   in	   general	   is	   perhaps	   the	   most	   outward-­‐open	  discipline	  of	  all,	  a	  highly	  expansionist	  intellectual	  endeavour	  without	  hardly	  any	  limits	   whatsoever.	   The	   possible	   domain	   of	   philosophy	   seems	   to	   contain	   just	  anything,	  from	  space	  and	  time	  to	  mind	  and	  society,	  from	  religion	  and	  science	  to	  love	  and	  language,	  from	  sports	  and	  sex	  to	  wine	  and	  war,	  from	  being	  and	  beauty	  to	  health	  and	  history,	  from	  music	  and	  money	  to	  dance	  and	  wisdom	  –	  and	  on	  we	  go.	   It	   is	   in	   this	   expansionist	   spirit	   that	   we	   propose	   enlarging	   the	   domain	   of	  philosophy	  of	  science	  so	  as	  to	  include	  interdisciplinarity!	  	  11.	   Some	   of	   the	   urge	   for	   interdisciplinarity	   originates	   from	   an	   intellectual	  
concern:	   the	   feeling	   that	   the	   unity	   of	   science	   has	   been	   lost	   due	   to	   the	  specializations	  and	  divisions	  within	  science	  having	  been	  taken	  very	  far.	  Relative	  to	   these	   concerns,	   interdisciplinarity	  manifests	   a	   dream	   of	   a	   regained	   unity	   in	  science.	  Another	  major	  reason	  -­‐	  I’d	  say	  the	  main	  reason	  -­‐	  for	  the	  current	  call	  for	  interdisciplinarity	   is	   a	  practical	   concern:	   science	   is	  divided	   into	  disciplines	  and	  sub-­‐disciplines,	   but	   most	   of	   the	   most	   pressing	   real-­‐world	   problems	   (from	  climate	  change	  to	  global	  poverty)	  aren’t	  so	  divided	  –	  so	  successfully	  addressing	  the	   latter	   requires	   crossing	   disciplinary	   boundaries	   and	   combining	   intellectual	  and	  other	  resources	  regardless	  of	  their	  disciplinary	  origins	  and	  sub-­‐disciplinary	  home	  grounds.	  This	  is	  in	  line	  with	  science	  being	  embraced	  by	  the	  current	  culture	  of	  accountability	  and	  practical	  relevance.	  	  	  	  12.	   In	   explaining	   the	   recent	   growth	   of	   interest	   in	   interdisciplinarity,	   it	   is	  advisable	  to	  consider	  extra-­academic	  versions	  of	  transdisciplinarity	  in	  separation	  from	  other	  versions.	  The	  current	  rushed	  fuss	  around	  interdisciplinarity	  is	  largely	  –	  but	  not	  only	  –	  motivated	  by	  the	  increasing	  pressures	  on	  science	  to	  serve	  extra-­‐scientific	  needs	  (such	  as	  solving	  practical	  problems	  recognized	  as	  significant	  by	  political	  or	  commercial	   forces)	  by	  way	  of	  reducing	  the	  power	  and	  autonomy	  of	  scientific	  disciplines	   (and	  so,	  perhaps,	  of	   science)	   in	   setting	   research	  goals	  and	  standards	   of	   research	   quality.	   The	   challenge	   of	   this	   sort	   of	   extra-­‐academic	  transdisciplinarity	   is	   to	   bridge	   the	   gap	   between	   narrow	   scientific	   puzzles	   and	  broad	   extra-­‐scientific	   problems.	   This	   is	   what	   is	   often	   called	   the	   “applicability	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gap”	   between	   deep	   but	   narrow	   disciplinary	   expertise	   and	   complex	   real-­‐world	  problems.	  	  	  The	  increasing	  social	  demand	  for	  this	  version	  of	  transdisciplinarity	  also	  shows	  in	  the	  dominant	   contemporary	   images	  of	   interdisciplinarity,	   those	   that	   are	  put	   in	  terms	  such	  as	  integration,	  collaboration,	  and	  participation.	  Since	  the	  real	  world	  is	  rich	   and	   complex,	   disciplines	   must	   join	   forces:	   the	   specialized	   disciplinary	  competences	   and	   practices	   as	   well	   as	   the	   simple	   and	   idealized	   disciplinary	  theories	   must	   be	   joined	   or	   integrated	   in	   order	   to	   get	   hold	   of	   the	   real-­‐world	  complexity.	  And	  because	  people	  living	  their	  real	  lives	  in	  that	  complex	  real	  world	  are	   faced	   with	   various	   practical	   problems	   –	   some	   of	   which	   are	   both	   very	  important	  and	  very	  difficult	  –	   scientific	  disciplines	  must	   join	   forces	  with	  extra-­‐scientific	   agents,	   engaging	   their	   cognitive	   and	   practical	   competences,	   interests	  and	  contributions,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  solve	  such	  problems.	  	  	  	  13.	  However,	  the	  range	  of	  interdisciplinarities	  is	  much	  broader	  (and	  older)	  than	  just	   those	   deriving	   from	   the	   new	   societal	   pressures	   towards	   bringing	   science	  closer	   to	   meeting	   practical	   challenges	   such	   as	   business	   innovation	   and	  environmental	  policy.	  The	  goals	  and	  needs	  that	  interdisciplinarity	  may	  serve	  are	  numerous,	  and	  many	  of	   these	  are	  more	  purely	  epistemic	  and	  academic,	  and	  so	  transcend	   the	   current	   transformation	   of	   the	   structures	   of	   the	   governance	   of	  science	   that	   seek	   to	   bring	   science	   closer	   to	   practical	   concerns	   and	   thereby	   to	  make	   it	   socially	  more	   relevant.	  Naturally,	   the	   socially	   and	   epistemically	   driven	  versions	  often	  intermingle.	  	  14.	   Another	   distinction	   that	   will	   be	   useful	   for	   understanding	   versions	   of	  interdisciplinarity	   is	   in	   terms	  of	  whether	   it	   is	   initiated	  and	  driven	  primarily	  by	  science	   managers	   or	   by	   practicing	   scientists.	   These	   may	   be	   called	  managerial	  
top-­down	   interdisciplinarity	   and	   practitioner	   bottom-­up	   interdisciplinarity,	  respectively.	   Many	   scientists	  may	   have	   the	   feeling	   that	   the	   latter	   comes	  more	  naturally	  while	  the	  former	  has	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  forced	  artificiality	  in	  it.	  However,	  it	  is	   obvious	   that	   sometimes	   the	   internal	   social	   dynamics	   of	   (inter)disciplinarity	  create	   intellectually	   harmful	   frictions	   and	   obstructions	   that	   may	   be	   best	   to	  remove	   by	   external	   intervention	   (for	   instance	   by	   manipulating	   external	  incentives	   such	   as	   research	   funding	   schemes	   or	   job	   structures).	   On	   the	   other	  hand,	  the	  top-­‐down	  version	  seems	  to	  have	  generated	  specific	  rhetorical	  practices	  related	   to	   interdisciplinarity.	   Indeed,	   it	   tends	   to	   be	   around	   the	   top-­‐down	  versions	   that	   the	   rhetoric	   of	   interdisciplinarity	   flourishes,	   both	   by	   funding	  agencies	   and	   administrators	   in	   calling	   for	   proposals	   for	   interdisciplinary	  research	  or	  education;	  and	  then	  by	  researchers	  and	  educators	  when	  responding	  to	   such	   declared	   demand,	   trying	   to	   persuade	   the	   former	   agents	   to	   grant	  resources	  for	  supposedly	  suitable	  interdisciplinary	  activities.	  	  	  
What’s	  there	  for	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  and	  how	  to	  capture	  it?	  	  15.	  How	  does	  the	  agenda	  of	  philosophy	  relate	  to	  disciplinarity	  within	  science	  –	  and	  within	  philosophy	  itself?	  Mainstream	  philosophy	  of	  science	  (as	  disciplinary	  practice)	   is	   largely	   a	   pro-­‐science	   endeavour,	   an	   attempt	   to	   reconstruct	   and	  explain	  science	  as	  a	  success	  story	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  conduct	  as	  rule-­‐bound	  –	  that	  is,	  as	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disciplined	  activity.	  It	  is	  in	  virtue	  of	  scientific	  practice	  being	  governed	  by	  certain	  rules	  of	  conduct	  –	  including	  the	  so-­‐called	  scientific	  method,	  whatever	  its	  details	  –	  that	  science	  can	  be	  celebrated	  for	  its	  epistemic	  and	  technological	  achievements.	  Much	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science	  has	  taken	  as	  its	  task	  to	  clarify	  and	  prescribe	  such	  rules	  and	  to	  explain	  these	  achievements	  as	  consequences	  of	  rule-­‐bound	  conduct.	  	  	  So	   there	   is	  a	  sense	   in	  which	  philosophy	  of	  science	  depicts	  scientific	  practice	  as	  disciplined	   –	   and	   hence	   disciplinary	   –	   activity.	   Yet	   ‘disciplinary’	   here	  must	   be	  understood	   in	   the	   generic	   sense	   of	   being	   disciplined,	   so	   this	   alone	   should	   not	  imply	  anything	  about	  any	  given	  specific	  disciplinary	  division	  or	  interdisciplinary	  relationship	   in	   science.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   versions	   of	   interdisciplinarity	   in	  science	  may	  be	   viewed	  as	   a	   risk	   for	   rule-­‐bound	   conduct	   (the	  presumed	  key	   to	  scientific	  success)	  and	   thereby	   for	   the	  popular	  agenda	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science	  (to	  explain	  and	  prescribe	  that	  success).	  This	  is	  because	  much	  of	  interdisciplinary	  activity	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  unconstrained	  by	  disciplinary	  rules	  and	  principles,	  and	  thus	   it	   lies	   beyond	   the	   agenda	  of	   standard	  philosophy	  of	   science:	   there	   are	  no	  rules	   or	   principles	   recognizable	   as	   ordinary	   disciplinary	   rules	   that	   could	   be	  invoked	   for	   explaining	   interdisciplinary	   pursuit	   and	   success.	   There	   are	  exceptions	   to	   this,	   including	   those	   versions	   of	   interdisciplinarity	   that	   promote	  (disciplined)	  unity	  of	  science;	  these	  can	  be	  seen	  simply	  as	  extensions	  of	  ordinary	  disciplinary	  aspirations.	  Nevertheless,	  much	  of	   interdisciplinarity	  appears	  to	   lie	  beyond	   the	   reach	   of	   philosophy	   of	   science’s	   typical	   agenda.	   This	   needs	   to	   be	  rectified.	  	  16.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   important	   recent	   developments	   in	   the	   philosophy	   of	  science	  reinforce	  its	  chances	  to	  successfully	  address	  issues	  of	  interdisciplinarity	  right	   now.	   One	   such	   development	   is	   related	   to	   the	   rise	   and	   establishment	   of	  various	   philosophies	   of	   special	   sciences.	   Let	   me	   narrate	   a	   stylized	   history,	  according	   to	   which	   philosophy	   of	   science	   used	   to	   be	   designed	   so	   as	   to	   be	  generally	  about	  all	  (good)	  science,	  dealing	  with	  supposedly	  general	  principles	  of	  adequate	   explanation	   and	   sound	   justification,	   for	   example.	   In	   the	   last	   few	  decades,	  a	  number	  of	  new	  more	  specialized	  fields	  have	  arisen	  within	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  each	  of	  them	  dealing	  with	  a	  particular	  scientific	  discipline	  or	  family	  of	  similar	   disciplines.	   So	   we	   now	   have,	   in	   an	   institutionalized	   form,	   specialized	  fields	   such	   as	   philosophy	   of	   biology,	   philosophy	   of	   chemistry,	   philosophy	   of	  cognitive	   science,	  philosophy	  of	  economics,	  philosophy	  of	  engineering,	  etc.	  The	  next	  natural	  step	  to	  take,	  enabled	  and	  facilitated	  by	  the	  previous	  one,	  is	  PhID,	  the	  philosophy	   of	   interdisciplinarity.	   On	   this	   streamlined	   history,	   the	   overall	  development	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science	  hence	  proceeds	  in	  three	  stages:	  	  
	  
First:	   General	   philosophy	   of	   science	   (dealing	   with	   science	   at	   large,	   or	  science	   in	   general,	   without	   paying	   systematic	   attention	   to	   disciplinary	  specialties).	  	  
Then:	  Philosophies	  of	   special	   sciences	   (such	  as	  philosophy	  of	  biology,	  of	  cognitive	  science,	  of	  economics).	  
Next:	  Philosophy	  of	  the	  relations	  between	  such	  scientific	  disciplines,	  that	  is,	  of	  interdisciplinarity.	  	  This	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  merely	  as	  a	  one-­‐way	   linear	  development.	   Indeed,	  once	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philosophies	   of	   special	   sciences	   and	   of	   interdisciplinarity	   have	   advanced	  sufficiently,	  the	  contents	  of	  general	  philosophy	  of	  science	  should	  be	  reconsidered	  and	   revised,	   based	   on	   the	   new	   more	   local	   information	   that	   will	   have	   been	  generated.	  	  17.	   It	   is	   now	   easier	   to	   see	   what	   kinds	   of	   information	   can	   be	   acquired	   by	  philosophies	   of	   interdisciplinarity.	   There	   are	   roughly	   two	   kinds	   of	   such	  information.	  
	  
Comparative	   information:	   This	   is	   information	   about	   the	   similarities	   and	  
differences	   between	   two	   or	   more	   disciplines	   or	   families	   thereof,	  regardless	   of	   what	   happens	   (or	   fails	   to	   happen)	   between	   them.	   As	  philosophies	   of	   special	   sciences	   are	  producing	   ample	   information	   about	  the	  characteristics	  of	  those	  sciences	  separately,	  comparative	  information	  is	  easier	  to	  generate,	  and	  it	  will	  be	  far	  more	  nuanced	  than	  ever	  before.	  So	  we	   may	   learn	   about	   the	   similarities	   and	   differences	   between,	   say,	  experimental	   and	   historical	   sciences,	   or	   between	   how	   economics	   and	  ecology	  model	  phenomena	  in	  their	  respective	  domains.	  	  
	  
Contactual	   information:	  This	   is	   information	  about	  what	  happens	   (or	   fails	  to	  happen)	  when	  two	  or	  more	  disciplines	  are	  brought	  in	  contact	  with	  one	  another.	  The	  production	  of	  contactual	  information	  requires	  going	  beyond	  mere	   combinations	   of	   bodies	   of	   disciplinary	   information	   generated	   by	  philosophies	   of	   special	   sciences.	   One	   must	   analyze	   the	   large	   variety	   of	  ways	   in	   which	   disciplines	   can	   be	   in	   consequential	   contact	   with	   one	  another	   –	   such	   as	   collaboration,	   inspiration,	   transfer	   of	   models	   or	  methods,	  evidential	  support	  or	  criticism,	  integration	  and	  unification,	  and	  so	   on.	   In	   some	   cases,	   one	  may	   be	   interested	   in	   generating	   information	  also	  about	  the	  reasons	  for	  failure	  to	  be	  in	  contact	  in	  these	  ways.	  	  	  	  This	  means	  that	  I	  am	  proposing	  a	  rather	  broad	  conception	  of	  what	  the	  philosophy	  
of	   interdisciplinarity	  would	  cover.	  Not	  only	  do	  I	  suggest	  enlarging	  the	  domain	  of	  PhID	   to	   encompass	   comparative	   investigations,	   but	   I	   also	   believe	   these	  investigations	   are	   important	   for	   the	   acquisition	   of	   contactual	   information	   too.	  The	  specific	  characteristics	  of	  distinct	  scientific	  disciplines	  make	  a	  difference	  for	  what	  happens	  when	  they	  are	  brought	  in	  contact	  with	  one	  another.	  Disciplines	  are	  
both	  similar	  and	  different	  with	  one	  another,	  and	  these	  similarities	  and	  differences	  are	   important	   to	   understand	   since	   success	   (and	   failure)	   in	   interdisciplinary	  contact	  typically	  requires	  both.	  If	  science	  were	  perfectly	  homogeneous	  across	  all	  relevant	   properties,	   there	   would	   be	   no	   hard	   issues	   or	   pressing	   challenges	   of	  interdisciplinarity;	   and	   if	   science	  were	   too	  heterogeneous,	   there	  would	  ne	   little	  hope	   for	   interdisciplinary	   contact.	   Indeed,	   the	   familiar	   challenges	   and	   troubles	  that	  often	  accompany	  interdisciplinary	  contact	  are	  manifestations	  of	  disciplinary	  heterogeneity.	   These	   two	   classes	   of	   information	   are	   vital	   also	   for	   possible	  
normative	   purposes.	   For	   example,	   comparative	   information	   may	   enable	   one	  discipline	   to	   learn	   from	   another,	   from	   what	   are	   perceived	   as	   (perhaps	   more)	  successful	   disciplinary	   principles	   and	   practices.	   Episodes	   of	   interdisciplinary	  learning	   are	   targets	   of	   contactual	   information	   that	  may	   be	   used	   for	   enhancing	  further	  interactive	  improvements.	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  18.	   There	   is	   an	   obvious	   analogy	   between	   comparative	   philosophy	   of	  interdisciplinarity	   and	   a	   branch	   of	   historical	   epistemology.	   Just	   as	   historical	  epistemology	   acknowledges	   and	   examines	   historically	   successive	   variation	   in	  scientific	  styles	  of	  reasoning	  and	  notions	  such	  as	  observation	  and	  objectivity,	  the	  comparative	  branch	  of	  PhID	  takes	  as	  its	  task	  the	  identification	  and	  analysis	  of	  the	  differences	   (and	   similarities)	   between	   various	   disciplines	   and	   their	   families	  regarding	   their	   styles	  of	   inquiry	  and	  argumentation,	   and	   their	   collectively	  held	  (yet	  possibly	  contested)	   ideas	  about	  excellence,	  novelty,	   rationality,	  objectivity,	  and	   knowledge,	   as	  well	   as	  more	  narrow	  notions	   such	   as	   theory,	   evidence,	   and	  unity.	   Philosophy	   of	   interdisciplinarity	   and	   historical	   epistemology	   are	   natural	  allies.	  	  	  19.	  There	  is	  another	  development	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science	  that,	  even	  though	  not	   yet	  materialized	   to	   a	   satisfactory	   extent	   and	   richness,	   is	   supportive	   of	   the	  called-­‐for	   philosophy	   of	   interdisciplinarity.	   This	   is	   the	   recent	   work	   in	   social	  
ontology	  and	  social	  epistemology,	  and	  their	  applications	   to	   the	  study	  of	  science.	  Since	  disciplines	  are	  institutional	  entities,	   interdisciplinarity	  has	  both	  epistemic	  and	  social	  aspects,	  and	  so	  its	  study	  implies	  a	  call	  for	  philosophy	  of	  science	  to	  go	  social.	   This	   will	   encompass	   looking	   into	   norms	   and	   conventions,	   status	   and	  authority,	   epistemic	   trust	   and	   recognized	   expertise,	   collective	   identity	   and	  emotion,	  collaboration	  and	  conflict,	  agreement	  and	  disagreement,	  consensus	  and	  dissensus,	   designed	   as	   well	   as	   spontaneous	   disciplinary	   structures,	   and	  more.	  Philosophy	   of	   interdisciplinarity	   –	   whether	   in	   search	   for	   comparative	   of	  contactual	   information	   –	  will	   have	   to	   look	   into	   the	  ways	   these	   things	   play	   out	  their	  roles	   in	  disciplinary	  and	  interdisciplinary	  practices.	  Meeting	  the	  challenge	  of	  incorporating	  such	  elements	  in	  philosophical	  accounts	  of	  science	  will	  promote	  the	  much-­‐awaited	  institutional	  turn	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  	  	  20.	   ‘Interdisciplinarity’	   is	   an	   element	   in	   popular	   contemporary	   slogans	   for	   the	  practical	   urge	   of	   doing	   interdisciplinary	   research	   and	   of	   doing	   research	   policy	  that	  supports	  such	  research.	  PhID	  therefore	  also	  must	  –	  and	  naturally	  does	  -­‐-­‐	  go	  along	   with	   the	   recent	   call	   for	  more	   practically	   relevant	   philosophy	   of	   science.	  Practical	   relevance	   comes	   in	   many	   varieties:	   relevance	   to	   scientific	   practice;	  relevance	   to	   science	   policy	   (and	   research	  management,	   research	   funding	   etc);	  relevance	   to	   society	   (science-­‐society	   relations	   as	   in	   extra-­‐academic	  transdisciplinarity).	   In	  principle,	   PhID	  has	   the	   capacity	   to	   be	   of	   relevance	  with	  respect	  to	  all	  these	  realms	  of	  practice.	  PhID	  will	  be	  appreciated	  by	  science	  policy	  makers	  who	  presently	   have	   rather	   limited	   understandings	   of	   the	   intricacies	   of	  interdisciplinarity	   and	   yet	   are	   hard	   pressed	   to	   promote	   it.	   PhID	   will	   be	  appreciated	  by	  practicing	  disciplinary	   scientists	  who	  are	  often	   rather	   confused	  when	   faced	   with	   the	   challenge	   of	   connecting	   their	   expertise	   with	   that	   in	  neighbouring	   disciplines.	   They	   can	   be	   helped	   by	   philosophers	  who	   are	   able	   to	  serve	   as	   interpreters	   and	   bridge	   builders	   between	   disciplines,	   invoking	   their	  characteristic	   expertise	   in	   examining	  broad	  general	  patterns	   as	  well	   as	  minute	  but	  significant	  details.	  It	  is	  not	  far	  fetched	  to	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  growing	  hidden	  demand	   for	   the	   services	   of	   PhID	   and	   that	   this	   will	   create	   an	   opportunity	   of	  making	  philosophy	  of	  science	  practically	  more	  relevant	  than	  ever.	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21.	  Naturally,	  philosophy	  of	  science	  has	  a	  history	  of	  dealing	  with	  issues	  that	  have	  interdisciplinary	   dimensions.	   To	   these	   belong	   themes	   such	   as	   the	   idea	   of	   the	  unity	   (and	   disunity)	   of	   science;	   reduction	   of	   theories	   and	   their	   ontologies;	  metaphysical	   issues	   of	   emergence	   and	   supervenience;	   “Kuhnian”	   issues	   of	  incommensurability	   and	   the	   “essential	   tension”;	   the	   arguments	   for	   and	  against	  methodological	   dualism	   between	   the	   natural	   and	   social	   sciences.	   The	   debates	  over	   these	   and	   other	   issues	   will	   be	   valuable	   for	   the	   future	   philosophy	   of	  interdisciplinarity;	   they	   typically	   highlight	   its	   logical,	   semantic	   and	   ontological	  aspects.	  What	  has	  been	  largely	  missing	  in	  these	  investigations	  and	  debates	  is	  the	  rich	  and	  complex	  institutional	  dynamics	  of	  disciplinarity	  and	  interdisciplinarity.	  These	  investigations	  will	  therefore	  be	  enriched	  by	  being	  brought	  in	  contact	  with	  the	  systematic	  study	  of	  interdisciplinarity.	  	  22.	   Reinforced	   by	   the	   manifoldness	   of	   interdisciplinarity	   and	   the	   issues	   it	  generates,	   a	   broad	   multitude	   of	   philosophical	   resources	   can	   and	   should	   be	  mobilized	   in	   its	   investigation.	  There	   is	  something	   in	   it	   for	  almost	  every	  area	  of	  philosophical	  expertise.	  The	  following	  lists	  just	  a	  few	  examples.	  a.	  The	  language	  customarily	  used	  for	  speaking	  about	  disciplines	  and	  their	  relationships	  require	  clarification,	  and	  this	   is	  where	  much	  of	  philosophy	  excels.	  This	   language	   is	   often	   heavily	  metaphorical	   or	   otherwise	   ambiguous.	   It	   begins	  with	   ‘discipline’	   itself,	   fortified	   by	   the	   proposed	   analogies	   with	   things	   such	   as	  nation	   states	   and	   guilds.	   Interdisciplinarity	   is	   often	   characterized	   in	   terms	   of	  geographical	   metaphors,	   such	   as	   ‘boundaries’	   between	   ‘areas’	   and	   ‘fields’	   that	  are	  ‘crossed’	  and	  ‘bridged’	  etc.	  ‘Integration’	  is	  another	  popular	  term	  desperately	  in	  need	  of	  analysis.	  	  b.	   Since	   the	   core	   concepts	   of	   discipline	   and	   interdisciplinarity	   denote	  institutional	   realities,	   their	   study	  will	  mobilize	   the	   tools	   of	   social	   ontology	   and	  
social	   epistemology.	   Institutional	   facts	   such	   as	   disciplinary	   convention	   and	  disciplinary	  identity	  as	  well	  as	  epistemic	  trust	  and	  expertise	  await	  examination.	  	  c.	  Model-­based	  accounts	  of	  science	  facilitate	  the	  study	  of	  interdisciplinary	  transfer.	   Models	   conceived	   as	   templates	   or	   otherwise	   abstract	   or	   generalized	  tools	  that	  are	  not	  tightly	  connected	  to	  some	  specific	  target	  or	  subject	  matter	  are	  easily	  seen	  as	  transportable	  across	  disciplinary	  boundaries.	  d.	   Erotetic	   approaches	   to	   science	   are	   well	   suited	   for	   highlighting	  interdisciplinary	   relations	   by	   focusing	   on	   the	   questions	   asked	   in	   disciplinary	  practices.	  For	  example,	  contrastive	  accounts	  of	  explanation	  are	  useful	  for	  dealing	  with	   situations	   of	   explanatory	   complementarity	   versus	   rivalry	   across	  disciplinary	  boundaries,	  by	  way	  of	  analyzing	  the	  contrastive	  questions	  they	  seek	  to	  answer.	  	  	   e.	  Philosophical	  accounts	  of	  mechanisms	  and	  mechanistic	  reasoning	  will	  be	  helpful	  in	  clarifying	  certain	  kinds	  of	  interdisciplinary	  relation.	  Different	  (families	  of)	   disciplines	   may	   entertain	   different	   notions	   of	   mechanism.	   Different	  disciplines	  may	  highlight	  different	  levels	  of	  organization	  in	  a	  vertical	  hierarchy	  of	  mechanisms,	  thereby	  complementing	  one	  another.	  And	  research	  fields	  may	  deal	  with	   horizontally	   parallel	   mechanisms	   that	   may	   coalesce	   variously,	   from	  reinforcing	  to	  confounding	  one	  another.	  	  	   f.	   Philosophical	   accounts	   of	   evidence	   and	   evidential	   support	   will	   offer	  important	  perspectives	  to	  and	  tools	  for	  examining	  situations	  in	  which	  evidence	  generated	  in	  one	  discipline	  is	  –	  or	  is	  not	  –
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or	  criticize	  theories	  and	  explanations.	  	  	   g.	   The	   good	   old	   issue	   of	   scientific	   discovery	   will	   be	   firmly	   back	   on	   the	  agenda	   of	   the	   philosophy	   of	   science.	   Interdisciplinary	   interactions	   have	   been	  advertised	  as	  an	  indispensable	  source	  of	  scientific	  creativity	  and	  innovation,	  and	  no	   doubt	   they	   do	   promote	   the	   development	   of	   new	   ideas,	   by	   ways	   such	   as	  analogy	  and	  even	  fusion.	  The	  principles	  and	  conventions	  that	  govern	  short-­‐term	  interdisciplinary	  projects	  of	  a	  collaborative	  kind	  are	  often	  negotiated	  within	  the	  context	  of	  discovery.	  	  h.	  Philosophical	  accounts	  of	  unity,	  unification,	  and	  integration	  will	  be	  very	  important	   in	   the	   future	   study	   of	   interdisciplinarity;	   after	   all,	   much	   of	   the	   fuss	  around	   interdisciplinarity	   is	   motivated	   by	   worries	   about	   specialization	   and	  fragmentation	  in	  scientific	  practice	  having	  gone	  too	  far.	  	  	   i.	   Issues	   of	   incommensurability	   will	  make	   a	   comeback,	  whether	   semantic,	  methodological	   or	   some	   other	   variety,	   responding	   to	   the	   recurrent	   complaint	  that	  the	  desired	  communication	  between	  disciplines	   is	  difficult	  to	  generate	  and	  sustain.	   Different	   disciplines	   often	   use	   the	   same	   terminologies	   in	   different	  meanings,	  and	  they	  may	  apply	  different	  styles	  and	  strategies	  in	  posing	  research	  questions	  and	  looking	  for	  answers	  to	  them	  as	  well	  as	  in	  assessing	  the	  credentials	  of	  the	  answers	  given.	  	  j.	  Old	  issues	  of	  demarcation	  between	  what	  is	  and	  what	  is	  not	  science	  -­‐	  or	  good	  science	  –	  will	  make	  a	  reappearance	  as	  scientific	  disciplines,	  possibly	  with	  very	  different	  epistemic	  and	  social	  status,	  are	  brought	  together,	  and	  disciplinary	  prejudices	  and	  pecking	  orders	  start	  shaping	  the	  attitudes;	  or	  as	  questions	  arise	  about	  the	  epistemic	  quality	  and	  status	  of	  extra-­‐academic	  bodies	  of	  belief	  that	  are	  supposed	   to	   be	   joined	   with	   academic	   knowledge	   and	   procedures.	   Indeed,	   I	  anticipate	  a	  new	  problem	  of	  demarcation	   to	  be	  put	  on	  the	  philosophical	  agenda	  for	  dealing	  with	  issues	  prompted	  by	  extra-­‐academic	  transdisciplinarity.	  k.	  Various	  dimensions	   in	   science-­society	   relations	  will	  be	  more	   firmly	  on	  the	   agenda	   of	   philosophy	   of	   science.	   These	   have	   to	   do	  with	   the	   governance	   of	  science	  as	  well	  as	  the	  production	  and	  application	  of	  knowledge	  insofar	  as	  these	  are	  extra-­‐academically	  constrained	  and	  facilitated.	  The	  role	  of	  values,	  their	  kinds	  and	  their	  ways	  of	  entering	  research	  will	  be	  burning	  issues,	  and	  so	  will	  issues	  of	  democratization	  and	  commercialization	  of	  science.	  	  23.	   Concerning	   the	   normative	   evaluation	   of	   disciplinary	   and	   interdisciplinary	  research,	   one	   should	   caution	   against	   hasty	   generalized	   claims.	   One	   cannot	  justifiably	  claim	  that,	  overall,	  one	  of	  these	  is	  good,	  bad,	  better,	  or	  worse	  than	  the	  other.	   The	   popular	   generalized	   notion	   that	   disciplinarity	   is	   constraining	   and	  conservative,	   an	   obstacle	   to	   progress	   and	   practical	   relevance,	   is	   often	   as	  incorrect	   as	   the	   related	   belief	   that	   interdisciplinarity	   is	   progressive	   and	  emancipatory	   and	   useful.	   It	   all	   depends	   on	   further	   contingencies.	   In	   general,	  there	   is	   a	   shortage	  of	   refined	   criteria	  usable	   for	  normative	   assessment.	  This	   is	  where	  philosophers	  should	  be	  of	  help.	  	  24.	  Putting	   interdisciplinarity	   in	  all	   its	   richness	  on	   the	  agenda	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science	   requires	   and	   enables	   the	   latter	   to	   reconsider	   its	   own	   methods	   and	  
principles	  of	  inquiry.	  This	  is	  a	  great	  opportunity	  for	  meta-­‐philosophical	  reflection	  –	   and	   for	   turning	   philosophical	   practice	   itself	   into	   a	   more	   interdisciplinary	  direction.	   The	   methods	   and	   methodological	   principles	   of	   philosophies	   of	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interdisciplinarity	  must	  be	  broadly	  based,	  so	  as	  to	  enable	  generating	  sufficiently	  detailed	   information	   about	   the	   numerous	   facets	   of	   the	   dynamics	   of	  interdisciplinary	  relationships.	  Given	  the	  weak	  or	  non-­‐existent	  guidance	  of	  much	  of	   interdisciplinary	   activity	   by	   conventional	   disciplinary	   rules	   (as	   suggested	  above	  in	  15),	  the	  role	  of	  various	  empirical	  studies	  of	  scientific	  practice	  becomes	  particularly	   important	   in	   PhID.	   The	   methods	   and	   principles	   applied,	   and	   the	  results	  they	  yield	  should	  complement	  and	  cross	  check	  one	  another.	  They	  include	  at	  least	  the	  following.	  a.	  Good	  old	  analysis	  of	  published	  scientific	  texts,	  dealing	  with	  issues	  such	  as	  meanings	  of	   terms,	   styles	   of	   reasoning,	   structures	   of	   arguments,	   ontological	  commitments,	  composition	  of	  scientific	  articles.	  	  b.	  Observation	  and	  participant	  observation	  of	  shop	  floor	  disciplinary	  and	  interdisciplinary	   practices.	   These	   can	   produce	   information	   about	   what	   lies	  behind	  the	  façade	  of	  textual	  facts.	  c.	  Questionnaires	  and	  interviews	  with	  practitioners	  in	  scientific	  research.	  While	   the	   self-­‐understanding	   and	   its	   verbal	   expressions	   (especially	   in	  rhetorically	   intricate	   situations)	   of	   practicing	   scientists	   is	   often	   limited	   and	  sometimes	   biased,	   they	   are	   a	   valuable	   additional	   source	   of	   information	   about	  scientific	  practices	  and	   their	  preconditions	  –	   including	   the	  possible	  biases	   they	  may	  exhibit.	  d.	   Interventionist	   techniques	   for	  generating	   interdisciplinary	  encounters	  with	   the	   aim	   of	   squeezing	   out	   information	   about	   disciplines	   and/or	  interdisciplinarities	   that	   would	   otherwise	   remain	   hidden	   or	   would	   be	   hard	   to	  acquire.	   By	   provoking	   such	   encounters	   we	   can	   force	   the	   disciplinary	  practitioners	  reveal	  facts	  that	  linger	  concealed	  in	  ordinary	  disciplinary	  practices.	  (This	  is	  the	  hard	  to	  achieve	  ideal	  of	  AID;	  see	  www.helsinki.fi/tint/aid).	  e.	  Philosophy	  of	  interdisciplinarity	  must	  itself	  be	  an	  interdisciplinary	  and	  inter-­‐field	  endeavour	  –	  it	  must	  welcome	  contributions	  from	  the	  social,	  historical	  and	   cognitive	   sciences	   as	   well	   as	   from	   other	   branches	   of	   philosophy,	   such	   as	  metaphysics,	  social	  epistemology,	  and	  political	  and	  moral	  philosophy.	  	  	  
Concluding	  remarks	  	  25.	   There	   may	   be	   understandable	   concerns	   about	   whether	   the	   very	   idea	   of	  
philosophy	   of	   interdisciplinarity	   is	   justified.	   One	   type	   of	   concern	   derives	   from	  perceptions	   of	   heterogeneity:	   interdisciplinarity	   comes	   in	   a	   huge	   variety	   of	  stripes	   and	   colors,	   it	   is	   nothing	  but	   a	  motley	   rummage	  of	   features	   of	   scientific	  practice,	   so	   it	   fails	   to	   provide	   a	   sufficiently	   stable	   and	   uniformly	   structured	  domain	   for	   specialized	   philosophical	   study.	  My	   response	  would	   start	   like	   this:	  Given	   that	   science	   at	   large	   is	   tremendously	   heterogeneous	   and	   that	   particular	  scientific	   disciplines	   are	   variously	   internally	   heterogeneous,	   the	   very	   idea	   of	  philosophy	  of	  interdisciplinarity	  is	  as	  warranted	  as	  are	  the	  notion	  of	  philosophy	  of	   science	   in	   general	   as	  well	   as	   the	   notion	   of	   the	   philosophy	   of	   any	   particular	  discipline,	  such	  as	  of	  biology	  or	  economics	  or	  archaeology.	  	  Another	   obvious	   line	   of	   defense	   is	   to	   be	   explicitly	   permissive	   about	   how	   to	  interpret	   the	   very	   idea	   of	   PhID.	   There	   is	   a	   stronger	   sense	   of	   ‘philosophy	   of	   X’	  according	   to	   which	   the	   goal	   is	   to	   develop	   a	   general	   philosophical	   theory	   of	   X	  providing	  a	  body	  of	  descriptive	  and/or	  normative	  statements	  and	  principles	  that	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organize	   our	   thoughts	   about	   X	   in	   a	   systematic	  manner.	   And	   there	   is	   a	  weaker	  sense	  on	  which	   the	  goal	   is	  not	   to	  develop	  a	   systematic	  general	   theory	  of	  X	  but	  rather	  to	  conduct	  philosophical	  studies	  of	  X	  that	  provide	  illuminating	  insights	  into	  X	   by	   way	   of	   applying	   philosophical	   concepts	   and	   tools	   to	   the	   examination	   of	  facets	   of	   X.	   It	   is	   evident	   that	  PhID	  must	   start	   out	  with	   such	  weaker	   ambitions.	  Only	  the	  future	  can	  tell	  whether	  this	  will	  lead	  to	  PhID	  in	  the	  stronger	  sense.	  This	  depends	  on	  the	  empirical	  discoveries	  and	  theoretical	   inventions	  to	  be	  made,	  so	  should	  not	  be	  based	  on	  any	  a	  priori	  commitment.	  	  	  	  26.	  To	  summarize	  the	  justification	  for	  the	  Call	  for	  PhID	  that	  was	  put	  forth	  in	  the	  introduction	   above,	   philosophy	   of	   interdisciplinarity	   will	   not	   only	   be	   a	   most	  natural	  next	  step	  to	  take,	  but	  it	  will	  be	  very	  useful	  for	  philosophy	  of	  science	  itself	  in	  several	  ways,	  such	  as	  these:	  	  a.	   PhID	   will	   generate	   more,	   and	   more	   up-­‐to-­‐date	   and	   more	   precise,	  information	   about	   contemporary	   science	   in	   general	   and	   specific	  disciplinary	   and	   interdisciplinary	   practices	   in	   particular.	   Philosophy	   of	  science	  will	   be	  more	   closely	   connected	   to	   science	   as	   actually	   practiced,	  and	  empirically	  better	  informed.	  In	  particular,	  PhID	  will	  help	  highlight	  the	  immense	   multiplicity	   and	   heterogeneity	   of	   science.	   Past	   philosophy	   of	  science	   has	   largely	   focused	   on	   what	   have	   been	   conceived	   as	  representative	  cases,	  often	  radically	  streamlined	  and	  idealized.	  PhID	  will	  require	  adding	  to	  the	  domain	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science	  further	  fields	  and	  disciplines,	   their	   multifarious	   interrelations,	   and	   kinds	   of	   scientific	  activity	  largely	  ignored	  thus	  far.	  The	  inclination	  of	  much	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science	   to	   be	   fascinated	   by	   the	   successes	   of	   science	   and	   to	   reconstruct	  them	  as	   consequences	   of	   neat	   disciplined	   conduct	  will	   be	   reconsidered.	  Paying	   attention	   to	   the	   less	   neat	   and	   less	   disciplined,	   and	  much	   of	   the	  time	  unsuccessful	  –	  yet	  massive	  and	  essential	  -­‐-­‐	  parts	  of	  scientific	  practice	  will	   help	   in	   broadening	   the	   domain	   of	   philosophy	   of	   science	   and	   in	  rethinking	   its	   own	  principles	  of	   conduct.	  The	   resulting	   image	  of	   science	  will	  be	  more	  nuanced,	  complex,	  and	  variegated.	  	  	  	   b.	  PhID	  will	  facilitate	  the	  much	  needed	  institutional	  turn	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science	  simply	  because	  disciplines	  and	  their	  dynamic	  relations	  –	  both	  within	  academic	  science	  and	  between	  academia	  and	  extra-­‐academic	  parts	  of	   society	   -­‐-­‐	   are	   institutional	   realities.	   It	   will	   also	   facilitate	   a	   related	  
cognitive	  turn	  since	  interdisciplinary	  dynamics	  typically	  involve	  situations	  of	  distributed	  and	  extended	  cognition	  among	  various	  disciplinary	  experts	  and	   technological	  artifacts.	  These	   turns	  require	  philosophy	  of	   science	   to	  become	  a	  more	  interdisciplinary	  and	  interfield	  activity	  itself.	  	  	  	  	   c.	  PhID	  will	   improve	  the	  practical	  relevance	  of	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  This	  will	  be	  particularly	  beneficial	  in	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  new	  regime	  of	  accountability	   –	   governed	   by	   the	   same	   forces	   that	   drive	   versions	   of	  interdisciplinarity	   itself,	   extra-­‐academic	   transdisciplinarity	   in	   particular.	  Because	   interdisciplinarity	   is	   such	  a	   trendy	  buzz	  word	   in	   contemporary	  science	   and	   science	   policy,	   and	   because	   both	   practicing	   scientists	   and	  science	   policy	   makers	   are	   frequently	   at	   a	   loss	   when	   dealing	   with	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interdisciplinary	  situations,	  philosophy	  of	  science	  will	  receive	  some	  extra	  leverage	   by	   systematically	   addressing	   these	   issues	   and	   by	   showing	   the	  usefulness	   of	   its	   own	   disciplinary	   perspectives	   and	   methods	   in	  illuminating	  some	  intricate	  aspects	  of	  interdisciplinarity	  in	  contemporary	  science.	  	  	  27.	  However,	  the	  self-­‐promotion	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science	  by	  means	  of	  launching	  the	   philosophy	   of	   interdisciplinarity	   as	   a	   research	   field	   must	   happen	   without	  compromise	  and	  corruption.	  It	  must	  be	  combined	  with	  both	  critical	  self-­‐scrutiny	  and	   proud	   self-­‐defense.	   Philosophy	   of	   interdisciplinarity	   must	   examine	   the	  discipline	   of	   philosophy	   itself	   by	   generating	   relevant	   comparative	   information	  about	  its	  peculiar	  and	  valuable	  characteristics	  –	  those	  that	  must	  not	  be	  sacrificed	  under	   the	  pressure	  of	   the	  new	  regime	  of	  accountability.	  Philosophy	  should	  not	  be	  for	  sale.	  The	  standards	  of	  measuring	  the	  value	  of	  its	  services	  are	  not	  those	  of	  biomedicine	  or	  geoengineering.	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